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Inequalities in the distribution of training in Britain   
 
Abstract 
This paper examines the inequalities in the distribution of training which exist in Britain. It does so by 
using a binomial logit regression model to examine training incidence and an ordered logit 
regression model to examine training intensity. The investigation uses a matched worker-workplace 
data set with origins in the 2011 Work and Employment Relations Study. Training inequalities are 
seen to correlate with both the personal characteristics of the individual and the characteristics of 
the workplace at which he/she is employed, notably age band, pay grade, tenure and the size of the 
workplace. However, the training premia which have traditionally accrued to males, graduates, 
those who have permanent contracts of employment and union members appear to be diminishing 
if not disappearing.    
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Inequalities in the distribution of training in Britain   
 
Introduction 
Education and training have rarely been off the policy agenda in Britain in recent years although the 
underlying rationale for this is contested (Keep et al, 2010). Conforming to the neo-liberal 
perspective of the salience of human capital investments, the influential Leitch Review (2006) 
ŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶĞĚƚŚĂƚ “ǁŚĞƌĞƐŬŝůůƐǁĞƌĞŽŶĐĞa key driver of prosperity and fairness, they are now the key 
ĚƌŝǀĞƌ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ?/ƚĂůŝĐƐŝŶƚhe original). Skills acquisition and development have become what Keep and 
Mayhew (2010) ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĂƐ “ƚŚĞƉŽůŝĐǇŵĂŬĞƌƐ ?ůĞǀĞƌŽĨĐŚŽŝĐĞ ? ?p. 566). Furthermore, the 
ƉŽƐƐĞƐƐŝŽŶŽĨ ‘skills ?ŚĂƐcome to be associated with a very diverse set of economic, personal and 
societal benefits. Consequently, skills development has come to be seen to be the potential solution 
ƚŽŵƵůƚŝĨĂƌŝŽƵƐĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĂŶĚƐŽĐŝĂů ‘ƉƌŽďůĞŵƐ ? ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ PĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚĂŶĚǁĂŐĞŝŶĞƋƵĂůŝƚŝĞƐ ?ƚŚĞ
relatively weak economic performance of both (some) firms and (some) regions of Britain in 
increasingly competitive global markets; low levels of inter-generational social mobility; welfare 
dependency; and anti-social behaviour.1  
A working assumption on the part of successive policy makers is that individuals, certified 
and qualified to varying levels, will be able to make use of their predominantly publicly funded, 
 ‘ŐĞŶĞƌĂů ?ĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶĂƐƚŚĞďĂƐŝƐĨŽƌƐƵďƐĞƋƵĞŶƚ ?ƉƌŝŵĂƌŝůǇƉƌŝǀĂƚĞůǇĨƵŶĚĞĚ and predominantly 
 ‘ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐ ?ƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐĂƚƚŚĞǁŽƌŬƉůĂĐĞ. The latter is especially important. As Green (2013) argues: 
 “ĞŵƉůŽǇĞƌƐĂƌĞŝŶĚŝƐƉĞŶƐĂďůĞĂĐƚŽƌƐŝŶƚŚĞƐƵƉƉůǇŽĨƐŬŝůůĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ ?ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶƐ
they make for work-ďĂƐĞĚůĞĂƌŶŝŶŐ ? ?p. 27).  
Policy makers may perceive training to be the policy lever most appropriate to addressing 
diverse public policy goals. Nevertheless, decision-makers within organisations hold very different 
perspectives. Their decisions with respect to training are influenced by private, corporate goals, 
corporate strategies and corporate and external environmental constraints. One consequence is that 
inequalities exist in the distribution of training (Lindsay et al, 2012). The skills of all employees may 
be crucial in some workplaces. In contrast, in other workplaces, for the majority of individuals, skills 
may be of minor consequence for the jobs they do. Hence the training the latter receive is designed 
often to meet only induction needs and regulatory and/or statutory requirements, such as health 
and safety (Keep, 2005). Therefore, the distribution of training varies across workplaces, in terms of 
its type, level and volume, explained by factors such as the size and industrial sector of the 
workplace at which the individual is employed. Furthermore, the distribution of training varies 
ǁŝƚŚŝŶǁŽƌŬƉůĂĐĞƐ ?ĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚďǇĨĂĐƚŽƌƐƐƵĐŚĂƐĂŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?ƐƋƵĂůŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ũŽďƐƚĂƚƵƐĂŶĚƐĂůĂƌǇ
(Green, 2013).  
To examine the nature and extent of these training inequalities in Britain, this paper 
investigates the determinants of training incidence and training intensity making use of a matched 
worker-workplace data set which has its origins in the 2011 Workplace and Employment Relations 
Study (WERS 2011). The comparative advantage of WERS 2011 in this context, for example relative 
to the Labour Force Survey which is frequently used to examine these issues, is the wealth of 
variables reflecting important characteristics of the workplace which are potentially available 
Sutherland, 2004: 2009). 
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In a period when other surveys suggest that the volume of training is declining (e.g. Felstead 
et al, 2012) and at a time when training decisions were affected by the recession consequent of and 
subsequent to the economic and financial crises of 2008-9 (van Wanroy et al, 2013), two questions 
motivate this research investigation: In terms of both their personal characteristics and the 
characteristics of the workplaces at which they are employed, who receives training? And how much 
training does an individual receive? In one respect, therefore, this paper reports an exploratory 
investigation, but one which addresses substantive issues. Previously, and not unexpectedly, some 
groups within the workforce, notably males, the more highly qualified, the more highly skilled, those 
holding permanent contracts of employment and union  members have received what might be 
ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚĂƐ ‘ƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐƉƌĞŵŝĂ ? ?ŽƚŚĞƐĞƉƌĞŵŝĂĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞƚŽĞǆŝƐƚ ?&ƵƌƚŚĞƌ ?ŵĂŶǇǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞ
workforce receive little or no training at all. What is the extent of this  ‘ƐŚŽƌƚĂŐĞ ?ŽĨƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐ? Has this 
increased or decreased? And if it has decreased what are the implications for skills policies, 
seemingly so central to achieving the diverse set of policy goals identified above?      
A literature context 
Green (2013) proposes a simple model of the emƉůŽǇĞƌ ?ƐƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ ?based upon private (as 
opposed to public) benefit-cost perspectives (and which abstracts from the crucial distinction 
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ‘ŐĞŶĞƌĂů ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐ ?ƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐĂŶĚƚŚĞƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂůĂŶĚĞŵƉŝƌŝĐĂůŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐǁŚŝĐŚĨŽůůŽǁ
from this) (cf. Harhoff and Kane, 1997, inter alia). According to this model, training is assumed to 
increase the marginal product of employees. Consequently, the employer benefits from any 
additional profit which accrues from this increase, net of any increase in wages paid to employees 
who receive training. The costs of training are associated with the production forgone on the part of 
trainees and trainers, and any fees paid to outside training agents/agencies. The marginal benefits of 
training will tend to fall over time. Similarly, the marginal costs of training will tend to rise. 
Consequently, for the profit-maximising employer, the point of intersection of the  decreasing 
marginal benefits of training and the increasing marginal costs of training will determine the 
optimum training point, for example in terms of training volume per worker as measured by the 
number of days training provided.   
Compatible with the expectations associated with this benefit-cost perspective, there is a 
degree of consensus in the empirical literature about the extent to which certain variables 
determine whether an individual in employment in Britain receives training, where the training in 
question is organised at the workplace (and usually paid for by the employer). Moreover, this 
consensus also exists in equivalent cross-country studies (Arulampalam et al, 2003: Leuven and 
Oosterbeek, 1999). Most of these variables relate to the personal characteristics of an individual. 
/ŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞǆƚŽĨĂŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?ƐƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐƚŝĐƐǁŚich do not relate to work, there is 
a correlation between training and age, with training being more likely for relatively younger 
members of the workforce and less likely for relatively older members. The younger the worker, 
over time, the greater the expected benefits to the employer from the training investments made 
(assuming, that is, the younger worker does not quit) (Green, 1993a: Taylor and Urwin, 2001). 
Similarly, there is a correlation between training and the level of formal qualifications held by the 
employee. The higher the level of qualification held, the more likely it is that an individual will 
receive training (Green 1993a). The marginal returns from training the more highly qualified tend to 




ĐŽƌƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐĂŶĚĂŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?ƐƉĂǇŐƌĂĚĞat the workplace, with those on the 
higher pay grades having a greater likelihood of receiving training (Arulampalam et al, 2003). Pay 
grades equate with skills possessed by job holders. There is a more frequent need to re-train and up-
skill personnel in the higher skill category. Hence the higher paid are the more likely to receive 
training. There ŝƐĂůƐŽĂĐŽƌƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐĂŶĚĂŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?ƐũŽďƐƚĂƚƵƐ ?ǁŝƚŚƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐ
being more likely to be given to those on full time contracts relative to those on either part time 
contracts or fixed term contracts (Greenhalgh and Mavrotas, 1996). By definition, those on non-
ƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚƐŽĨĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚĂƌĞŵŽƌĞůŝŬĞůǇƚŽďĞƉĂƌƚŽĨĂŶĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĨůĞǆŝďůĞ
workforce, hired and fired according to the product market circumstances, prevailing or forecast. 
Consequently, the potential pay offs from any training investments in members of these groups are 
more problematical. Further, there is a correlation between training and tenure. Training is more 
ůŝŬĞůǇĚƵƌŝŶŐĂŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?ƐĞĂƌůǇƉĞƌŝŽĚŽĨĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚĂƚƚŚĞǁŽƌŬƉůĂĐĞĂƐŚĞ ?ƐŚĞĂĐƋƵŝƌĞƐ ?
develops and learns to apply the skills required for the job undertaken (Green, 1991: Greenhalgh 
and Mavrotas, 1994). Finally, there is a correlation between training and trade union membership, 
with the individual who is a trade union member being more likely to receive training. Two distinct 
explanations are forwarded for this relationship. First, unionised workplaces tend to be more stable, 
something which generates a longer time horizon over which to calculate the benefits which accrue 
from investments in training. Secondly, the collective voice mobilised by the union at the workplace 
advocates training for its members; and there has been an increasing interest on the part of the 
trade union movement in Britain in promoting learning at work (Boheim and Booth, 2004: Booth, 
1991: Green, 1993b: Findlay and Warhurst, 2011: Hoque and Bacon, 2008).    
ǇǁĂǇŽĨĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚ ?ŝŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞǆƚŽĨĂŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?ƐƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐƚŝĐƐ ?ƚŚĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ
between gender and training received has generated more controversy in the empirical literature. 
Early studies (Booth, 1991: Greenhalgh and Stewart, 1987) suggest males are more likely to receive 
training than females. Later studies suggest that the extent of the female training deficit was 
diminishing (Greenhalgh and Mavrotas, 1994: 1996). Most recently, however, Jones et al (2008) 
argue that the gender differential has now been reversed. Females, ceteris paribus, are more likely 
than males to receive training. 
'ƌĞĞŶ ?ƐďĞŶĞĨŝƚ-cost perspective of the training decision also helps explain the consensus 
which is to be found in the empirical literature on the relationship between training and workplace 
size, an important characteristic of the workplace at which an individual is employed. There is a 
correlation between the likelihood that an individual receives training and workplace size (Green 
1991: 1993a: Greenhalgh and Mavrotas, 1996: Harris, 1999). Usually, there are economies of scale in 
training provision. Consequently, the marginal cost of training an individual employee is lower in 
larger establishments. Conversely, the marginal cost of training an individual employee tends to be 
higher in smaller establishments because of the relatively higher opportunity costs associated with 
withdrawing an individual from work. 
However, in contrast, there is a degree of controversy over the extent to which training 
varies with the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) of the activity undertaken at the workplace 
and the formal i.e. legal status of the workplace. For example, Booth (1991) finds training to be more 
likely within the public sector because of the profit making constraints under which private sector 
workplaces operate. Greenhalgh and Mavrotas (1996) find that training is more likely within the 
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 ‘ŶŽŶ- ƚƌĂĚŝŶŐ ?ƐĞĐƚŽƌƐŽĨƚŚĞĞĐŽŶŽŵy (e.g. health, education, central and local government). These 
controversies tend to reflect both the limitations (in terms of the potential regressors available) and 
dates of the data sets analysed. Over time in Britain, what constitutes the public sector - and the 
terms of reference of some workplaces within it  W has changed. Further, technical change has 
necessitated revisions to the SIC. That said, if adopting a different statistical methodology, Murphy 
et al (2008) conclude, unambiguously, that an individual in the public sector, relative to the 
equivalent individual in the private sector, has a training advantage, mostly attributable to the 
higher skill content of the nature of the work done by the former. 
The Data set: the 2011 Workplace Employment Relations Study 2 
The 2011 Workplace Employment Relations Study is the sixth in a series of workplace surveys which 
map the changing contours of employment relations in Britain (Brown et al, 2009). There are four 
components to the 2011 study viz.: the Survey of Managers; the Survey of Worker Representatives; 
the Survey of Employees; and, for workplaces in the trading sector, the Financial Performance 
Questionnaire (van Wanrooy et al, 2013). The Survey of Managers is of central importance. The 
other components have their origin in the population of workplaces sampled for this survey. The 
data set examined in this investigation is a matched merger of the survey of managers and the 
survey of employees.  
For the 2011 study, the population sampled for the survey of managers is all workplaces in 
Britain which have five or more employees operating in Sections C-S of the 2007 Standard Industrial 
Classification (i.e. Agriculture and Mining is excluded). A workplace is defined as comprising the 
activities of a single employer at a single set of premises. The population sampled accounts for 35 
per cent of all workplaces in Britain and 90 per cent of all employees. 
Previous studies had made use of two distinct samples. One was a new cross section sample 
of workplaces. This was designed to provide representative results for the population of workplaces 
in existence at the time of the survey. The other was a panel sample comprising workplaces which 
had participated in the most recent previous cross section survey and which remained in existence 
at the time of the new survey. This panel sample was used to examine the extent to which and the 
manner in which individual workplaces had changed over time. The two samples were analysed 
separately (Culley et al, 1999: Kersley et al, 2006: Millward et al, 2000).   
The novel design feature of the 2011 study was the integration of the new cross section 
ƐĂŵƉůĞǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƉĂŶĞůƐĂŵƉůĞ ?ŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇ ?ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĂ ‘ƉĂŶĞůƐĂŵƉůĞ ? ?Ă ‘ƌĞĨƌĞƐŚŵĞŶƚƐĂŵƉůĞ ? ?ĂŶĚ
Ă ‘ĐŽŵďŝŶĞĚƐĂŵƉůĞ ? ?dŚĞ ? ? ? ?ƐĂŵƉůĞdesign had two aims. The first was to obtain interviews at 
900 of the 2,295 workplaces which had participated in the cross section sample of 2004. These were 
ƚŽĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞƚŚĞ ‘ƉĂŶĞůƐĂŵƉůĞ ? ?dŚĞƐĞĐŽŶĚǁĂƐƚŽŽďƚĂŝŶŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁƐĂƚĂĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?ǁŽƌŬƉůĂĐĞs, 
selected as a stratified random sample from the Inter Departmental Business Register maintained by 
ƚŚĞKĨĨŝĐĞĨŽƌEĂƚŝŽŶĂů^ƚĂƚŝƐƚŝĐƐ ?dŚĞƐĞǁĞƌĞƚŽĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞƚŚĞ ‘ƌĞĨƌĞƐŚŵĞŶƚƐĂŵƉůĞ ? ?tŚĞŶƚĂŬĞŶ
ƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ ?ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ?ƚŚĞ ‘ƉĂŶĞůƐĂŵƉůĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞ ‘ƌĞĨƌĞƐŚŵĞŶƚƐĂŵƉůĞ ?ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞƚŚĞ ‘ĐŽŵďŝŶĞĚ
ƐĂŵƉůĞ ? ? 
The profiles of these samples are important. The survey design took cognisance of 
workplace size and industry sector. The ultimate aim was to select panel and refreshment samples, 
which, when combined, would generate a final sample which had at least 250 workplaces in the 
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following size bands viz. 5 -9 employees; 10  W 24; 25 -49; 50 -99; 100  W 199; and 200 -499: at least 
150 workplaces in the following size bands viz. 500 -999; 1000 -1999; and 2000+: and a minimum of 
85 cases in each industry sector. The sample design, therefore, gives an above average probability of 
selection to larger workplaces and workplaces in less populated industries. TŚĞƌĞƐƵůƚŝŶŐ ‘ĐŽŵďŝŶĞĚ
ƐĂŵƉůĞ ?, therefore, is not representative of the total population of workplaces in Britain. Hence, 
analysis needs to make use of the appropriate weighting factor for each component of the survey, 
partly to account for the sampling bias in the original survey design and partly to account for variable 
rates of non-response in its components.  
At each participating workplace, the most senior manager responsible for employment 
relations/human resources/personnel was interviewed. Prior to this interview, this manager was 
asked to provide a demographic profile of the workplace. The management questionnaire sought 
information on the following: workplace/organisation characteristics; the management of personnel 
and employment relations; recruitment, training and the organisation of work; consultation and 
communication; representation at work; payment systems and pay determination; collective 
disputes and procedures; fair treatment at work; workplace flexibility; workplace performance; and 
workplace change.    
At each participating workplace, permission was sought from the manager to distribute a 
self-completion questionnaire to employees at the workplace. If the manager agreed, 25 employees 
were selected randomly from a list of all employees and invited to complete the questionnaire. At 
workplaces with fewer than 25 employees, each employee participated. In addition to asking 
questions which related to the personal characteristics of the individual and his/her household 
ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐƚŝĐƐ ?ƚŚĞƐƵƌǀĞǇŽĨĞŵƉůŽǇĞĞƐƐŽƵŐŚƚŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?ƐũŽď ?ƚŚĞ
workplace at which he/she is employed; personal views about working at this workplace; and 
representation at work. 
The focus of this investigation of training inequalities is responses to the following question 
asked in the survey of employees:  
 “ƉĂƌƚĨƌŽŵŚĞalth and safety training, how much training have you had during the last 12 
ŵŽŶƚŚƐ ?ĞŝƚŚĞƌƉĂŝĚĨŽƌŽƌŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĞĚďǇǇŽƵƌĞŵƉůŽǇĞƌ ? ? 
Column 2 of Table 1 shows the percentage distribution of responses to the question 
ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚ ?/ŶƚŚĞĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐǁŚŝĐŚĨŽůůŽǁƐ ? ‘tŚĞƚŚĞƌŽƌŶ ƚĂŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƌĞĐĞŝǀĞƐƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐ ?ŝƐĂƐƐƵŵĞĚ
ƚŽĚĞĨŝŶĞ ‘ƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐŝŶĐŝĚĞŶĐĞ ? ? ? ?ƉĞƌĐĞŶƚƌĞĐĞŝǀĞĚŶŽƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐ ?ǆƉƌessed otherwise, the training 
participation rate was 68 per cent. The six categories of the number of days of training received are 
ƵƐĞĚƚŽĚĞĨŝŶĞ ‘ƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐŝŶƚĞŶƐŝƚǇ ? ? 
Insert Table 1 near here 
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 1 show the corresponding percentage distribution of responses to 
the same question from the equivalent surveys undertaken in 2004 and 1998 (Kersley et al, 2006: 
Cully et al, 1999). Two observations may be made from a comparison of the three percentage 
distributions. First, between 1998 and 2011, the percentage who receives no training decreases 
progressively from 36.07 per cent in 1998 to 31.99 per cent in 2011. Secondly, the percentage who 
receives the two greatest number of days of training also decreases progressively, from 18.96 per 
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cent in 1998 to 15.89 per cent in 2011. The second observation is compatible with Felstead ĞƚĂů ?Ɛ 
(2012) claim that the volume of training has decreased over the last decade. Also, it may be a 
ŵĂŶŝĨĞƐƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĞŵƉůŽǇĞƌƐ ?ĚĞƐŝƌĞƚŽ ‘ƚƌĂŝŶƐŵĂƌƚĞƌ ? ?ĂƐƋƵŽƚĞĚŝn Felstead et al, 2012, p. 983).   
The Estimation Models   
In the models estimated, the assumption is that an individual participates in training if the net 
benefits of the final outcome (to employer, employee or some combination of both) is perceived to 
be positive, a decision which may be modelled as a latent variable.  
A conventional binomial logitistic regression model is used to identify the determinants of 
training incidence (i.e. the likelihood that an individual receives training) viz.: 
  yiw  = Xiw ɴA?ɸiw 
where yiw  is the recoded response of an individual (i) in a workplace (w); Xiw   ɴ ĂŶĚɸiw are, 
respectively, a vector of independent variables, a set of coefficients to be estimated, and an error 
term (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010). In the estimation, yiw = 1, if the individual reports that he/she 
received training (and = 0 otherwise) (Table 1).  
An equally conventional ordered logitistic regression model is used to identify the 
determinants of training intensity (i.e. the likelihood that an individual receives one of the six 
training outcomes measured in terms of the number of days of training received) (Table 1). It too 
conforms to convention viz.:     
   y*iwm   =  Xiw ɴ  A?ɸiw 
such that,   
  yiw  A? ? ?ŝ ?Ğ ? ‘ŶŽŶĞ ? ?      if   ʏ0   = - A?A?Ǉ ?i AMʏ1  
  yiw  A? ? ?ŝ ?Ğ ? ‘ůĞƐƐƚŚĂŶ ?ĚĂǇ ? ?ŝĨ   ʏ1   A? A?Ǉ ?i  AMʏ2 
  yiw  A? ? ?ŝ ?Ğ ? ‘ ?ƚŽůĞƐƐƚŚĂŶ ?ĚĂǇƐ ? ?ŝĨ ʏ2  A? A? Ǉ ?i  AMʏ3 
  yiw  A? ? ?ŝ ?Ğ ? ‘ ?ƚŽůĞƐƐƚŚĂŶ ?ĚĂǇƐ ? ?ŝĨ   ʏ3  A? A?Ǉ ?i  AMʏ4  
  yiw  A? ? ?ŝ ?Ğ ? ‘ ?ƚŽůĞƐƐƚŚĂŶ ? ?ĚĂǇƐ ? ? if  ʏ4  A? A?Ǉ ?i  AMʏ5  
  yiw  A? ? ?ŝ ?Ğ ? ‘ ? ?ĚĂǇƐ or more ? ?     if    ʏ5  A?A?Ǉ ?i  AMʏ6 A?A? 
where yiwm is the response of an individual (i) in a workplace (w) reporting the number of days of 
ƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐƌĞĐĞŝǀĞĚ ?ŵ ? ?ʏŝƐƐŽŵĞƚŚƌĞƐŚŽůĚƉŽŝŶƚǁŚĞƌĞ ?ǁŚĞŶĐƌŽƐƐĞĚďǇƚŚĞůĂƚĞŶƚǀĂƌŝĂďůĞǇ ? ?ƚŚĞ
observed number of days of training received category changes; and Xiw   ɴ ĂŶĚɸiw are, respectively, 
a vector of independent variables, a set of coefficients to be estimated, and an error term (Cameron 
and Trivedi, 2010).  
In both models, the vector of independent variables comprises variables of three sorts: viz.  
variables denoting the personal characteristics of an individual which are independent of the 
workplace (such as gender, age and formal qualifications); variables which denote the personal 
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characteristics of an individual which relate to the workplace (such as pay, job status and tenure); 
and variables which denote the characteristics of the workplace at which the individual is employed 
(such as its formal i.e. legal status and the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) of the activity 
undertaken at the workplace). A full list of the independent variables employed in the estimations is 
presented in column 1 of Table 3. 
'ŝǀĞŶďŽƚŚƚŚĞŵŽĚĞůŽĨƚŚĞĞŵƉůŽǇĞƌ ?ƐƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶĂŶĚƚŚĞĞŵƉŝƌŝĐĂůƐƚƵĚŝĞƐƌĞǀŝĞǁĞĚ
above, therefore, the a priori expectations are that the receipt of training and the amount of training 
received will correlĂƚĞǁŝƚŚĂŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?ƐĂŐĞ ?ƋƵĂůŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ƉĂǇŐƌĂĚĞ ?ũŽďƐƚĂƚƵƐ ?ƚĞŶƵƌĞ ?ĂŶĚ
union membership status; and the size and formal status of the workplace at which he/she works. 
More precisely, the likelihood that an individual receives training  W and the amount of training an 
individual receives  W will be greater for those in the relatively younger age groups; those who have 
degree status; those in the relatively higher pay groups; those who hold permanent contracts of 
employment; those who are new or relatively more recent recruits to the workplace; those who are 
union members; and those who are employed in relatively larger sized establishments. In contrast, 
however, the nature of the relationship between training and other variables, notably gender, is 
assumed to be more problematical.   
The Results  
First the principal results of the models estimating training incidence and training intensity, 
respectively, are presented. The detail may be observed in the relevant tables. Then both sets of 
results are discussed.  
Training incidence 
The variables associated with ĂŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?ƐƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐƚŝĐƐŽĨage, pay grade, tenure and 
trade union membership are jointly statistically significant (Table 2, columns 2, 3 and 4). Further, 
many of the coefficients of the relevant individual variables are signed appropriately, although not 
all are statistically significant (Table 3, columns 2, 3 and 4). Notably (where all results are relative to 
the appropriate reference category), an individual in the relatively younger age bands is more likely 
to receive training whereas an individual in the relatively older age bands is less likely to receive 
training; an individual in the relatively lower pay grades is less likely to receive training whereas an 
individual in the relatively higher pay grades is more likely to receive training; an individual with 
relatively shorter lengths of tenure is more likely to receive training whereas an individual with 
relatively longer tenure durations is less likely to receive training; and an individual who is no longer 
a trade union member or an individual who has never been a trade union member is less likely to 
receive training. 
Insert Tables 2 and 3 near here 
 However, although this time in the context of single variables which reflect the personal 
characteristics of the individual: the coefficient of female (relative to male) is positively signed, but 
the result is not statistically significant; and the coefficient denoting graduate status (relative to the 




In the context of the sets of factor variables associated with the characteristics of the 
workplace at which the individual is employed, workplace size, the SIC of the workplace and the 
formal status of the workplace are each jointly statistically significant in identifying the determinants 
of training incidence (Table 2, columns 2, 3 and 4). In terms of the coefficients of the individual 
variables associated with workplace size, relative to the appropriate reference category, whereas an 
individual who is employed at relatively smaller workplaces is less likely to receive training, an 
individual who is employed at relatively larger workplaces is more likely to receive training. The 
effect of the SIC of the activity undertaken at the workplace at which the individual is employed 
upon the likelihood that an individual receives training is seen best in the context of some 
illustrative, statistically significant, examples, where all results are relative to the reference category 
of an individual employed in Education. An individual employed in Manufacturing; in Construction; in 
Accommodation and Food Services; and in Information and Communication is less likely to receive 
training. In contrast, an individual employed in Real Estate Activities; and in Human Health and Social 
Work Activities is more likely to receive training. Finally in the context of the formal status of the 
establishment, relative to the reference category of an individual employed in a workplace in 
local/central government, an individual employed in a workplace which is a government owned 
limited company is less likely to receive training. In contrast, an individual employed in a workplace 
which is a QUANGO is more likely to receive training. 
Training intensity  
There are some minor, but nonetheless important, differences between the determinants of training 
intensity and the previously reported determinants of training incidence.   
In the context of the determinants of training intensity, the sets of factor variables 
associated with age band; pay grade; tenure; trade union membership; the size of the workplace; 
the SIC of the workplace; and the formal status of the workplace are again jointly statistically 
significant. In this instance, however, so too is the set of factor variables associated with job status 
(Table 2, columns 5, 6 and 7). Furthermore, in terms of the individual dummy variables associated 
with these eight sets of factor variables, more of these are statistically significant in the context of 
age band; pay grade; job status; and the formal status of the workplace. Partly off- setting this, 
fewer of the individual dummy variables associated with the size of the workplace are statistically 
significant (Table 3, columns 5, 6 and 7). The signs of the coefficients of the single dummy variables 
(and their statistical significance) denoting having graduate status; having no academic 
qualifications; having no professional/vocational qualifications; and having supervisory 
responsibilities do not change. However, the sign of the coefficient of female changes from being 
positive in the context of training incidence to being negative in the context of training intensity. 
Once again, the result is not statistically significant.    
If anything, therefore, the ordered logistic model of training intensity provides superior 
estimates to the binomial logit model of training incidence. dŚĂƚƚŚĞ ? ‘ĐƵƚƐ ?ĚĞŶŽƚŝŶŐƚŚĞůĂƚĞŶƚ
variable crossing over to greater amounts of training received are also statistically significant further 
substantiates this argument.   
Whereas the sign of the coefficient of a variable in the logit regression denotes that training 
is more/less likely to be received, the sign of the coefficient of a variable in the ordered logit 
regression reflects whether the latent variable increases/decreases with the regressor e.g. when the 
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coefficient of an independent variable is positive then an increase in the value of this variable 
ĚĞĐƌĞĂƐĞƐƚŚĞůŝŬĞůŝŚŽŽĚŽĨďĞŝŶŐŝŶƚŚĞůŽǁĞƐƚĐĂƚĞŐŽƌǇ ?ŝŶƚŚŝƐŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞ ‘ŶŽƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐ ? ?ĂŶĚŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞƐ
the likelihood of being in the highest category (in this instance receiving 10 days or more of training).   
The average marginal effects of the six possible training outcomes associated with the 
ordered logit regression are reported in Table 4. An examination of these makes manifest the nature 
and extent of inequalities in the distribution of training received by individuals. Three statistically 
significant results illustrate this well (where all the numerical outcomes reported are relative to the 
appropriate reference category).  
First, in the context of pay grade, an individual earning £61 -£100 per week is +6.7 per cent 
more likely to receive no training. He/she is -1.5 per cent less likely to receive five to less than 10 
days of training, and -1.0 per cent less likely to receive 10 days or more of training. In contrast, an 
individual earning £521 -£650 per cent is -11.9 per cent less likely to receive no training. He/she is 
+4.0 per cent more likely to receive five to less than 10 days of training, and +3.0 per cent more 
likely to receive 10 days or more of training. Secondly, in the context of the SIC of the workplace at 
which the individual is employed, an individual employed in Manufacturing is +12.4 per cent more 
likely to receive no training. He/she is -4.3 per cent less likely to receive five to less than 10 days of 
training, and -3.2 per cent less likely to receive 10 days or more of training. In contrast, an individual 
employed in Real Estate Activities is -5.0 per cent less likely to receive no training. He/she is +2.5 per 
cent more likely to receive five to less than 10 days of training, and +2.2 per cent more likely to 
receive 10 days or more of training. Finally, in the context of the formal status of the workplace, an 
individual employed in a government-owned limited company is +11.2 per cent more likely to 
receive no training. He/she is -3.3 per cent less likely to receive five to less than 10 days of training, 
and -2.3 per cent less likely to receive 10 days or more of training. In contrast, an individual 
employed in a QUANGO is -16.0 per cent less likely to receive no training. He/she is +8.0 per cent 
more likely to receive five to less than 10 days of training, and +8.5 per cent more likely to receive 10 
days or more of training. 
Insert Table 4 near here 
That said, some of the results of the ordered logisitic regression of training intensity which 
are not statistically significant also warrant note. The coefficients of the variables denoting female 
and graduate status are not statistically significant (and, moreover, both are negatively signed). One 
of the two coefficients associated with the sets of variables denoting job status and trade union 
membership is not statistically significant. The coefficients of the two individual variables denoting 
the largest size of workplace are not statistically significant (although their positive signs accord with 
expectations). And, finally, eight of the coefficients of individual variables denoting the formal status 
of the workplace are not statistically significant. 
Discussion  
In many respects, these results are in accord with the a priori expectations specified above which 
ƌĞĨůĞĐƚƚŚĞĚĞĚƵĐƚŝŽŶƐǁŚŝĐŚŵĂǇďĞŵĂĚĞĨƌŽŵ'ƌĞĞŶ ?ƐŵŽĚĞůŽĨƚŚĞĞŵƉůŽǇĞƌ ?ƐƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ ?
Furthermore they confirm many of the conclusions made in earlier studies of the determinants of 
training. The nature of the training inequalities which exist in Britain, manifest in the context of 
training incidence and training intensity, are seen to correlate with factors associated with both the 
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personal characteristics of an individual and the characteristics of the workplace at which he/she is 
employed, notably age band; pay grade (which is assumed to proxy skill); tenure; and the size of the 
workplace. For example, articulated in terms of the determinants of training incidence, younger 
workers are more likely to receive training, whereas older workers are not; higher paid members of 
the workforce are more likely to receive training, whereas the less highly paid are not; individuals 
who are newly recruited to workplaces are more likely to receive training, whereas those with longer 
tenure are not; and those who work in larger workplaces are more likely to receive training, whereas 
those employed in smaller workplaces are not. 
In contrast to these same expectations and earlier empirical studies, there is some evidence 
which suggests that in some instances training inequalities have diminished, if not disappeared. 
Traditional training premia no longer appear to accrue unambiguously to males, graduates; those in 
permanent jobs; and those who are trade union members. Indeed, this may be seen as the major 
empirical finding of the exploratory research reported.   
As noted in the literature review, previous studies of the determinants of training have 
reported gender inequalities, initially in favour of males and more recently in favour of females. Over 
time, the composition of employment in Britain has changed and with it the industrial and 
occupational distribution of employment. All of this has had a gender bias. It may well be that 
initially the diminution in the magnitude of the male training premium and latterly its apparent 
disappearance/reversal is attributable to these factors (Connelly and Gregory, 2007). Alternatively 
(perhaps additionally?) that there is no statistically significant difference between females and males 
with respect to training incidence and training intensity to be found in the results reported in this 
paper may be attributable to the comparative advantage of using a matched worker-workplace data 
set which allows for more appropriate controls for the industrial sectors and the types workplaces 
into which females tend to be concentrated.  
Much has been ŵĂĚĞŽĨ ‘ŽǀĞƌ-ĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŝŶĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇƐƚƵĚŝĞƐŽĨƚŚe labour market in 
Britain, especially the possibility that, currently, not all graduates are employed in traditional 
 ‘ŐƌĂĚƵĂƚĞ ?ũŽďƐ ?ŽůƚŽŶĂŶĚsŝŐŶŽůĞƐ ? ? ? ? ? PJones et al, 2013: Sloane et al, 1999). That graduates do 
not appear to receive their conventional training premium in the estimations undertaken in this 
investigation may be another manifestation of this phenomenon. To the extent that not all 
graduates are employed ŝŶũŽďƐǁŚŝĐŚŵĂǇďĞĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐ ‘ŚŝŐŚƐŬŝůůĞĚ ?ũŽďƐ, therefore, there is less 
likelihood that they will receive the training premium accorded to those in high skilled jobs.  
Relative to those having typical, permanent contracts of employment, individuals holding 
atypical, temporary employment contracts are more likely to receive no training and less likely to 
receive substantive days of training, although the same cannot be said about those holding atypical, 
fixed period contracts of employment. Formerly, the typical and atypical employment contract 
holders were seen to be complements within many workforces, with the latter facilitating flexibility 
ǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞǁŽƌŬƉůĂĐĞ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůůĂďŽƵƌŵĂƌŬĞƚ ?EŽǁ ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞĚƉƌĞǀĂůĞŶĐĞŽĨŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ
holding fixed term contracts of employment at many workplaces, they are more like substitutes than 
complements. Inter alia, this requires that they, too, receive training, if only to meet the regulatory 
requirements in operation in some sectors of the economy. This may tend to erode the conventional 
training premium associated with staff holding permanent contracts of employment.  
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Relative to trade union members, those who have never been union members are more 
likely to receive no training and are less likely to receive substantive days of training. However, the 
same cannot be said for those who once were but who no longer are union members. Trade union 
membership in Britain is now increasingly concentrated into particular industrial sectors of the 
economy and, within these particular sectors, specific workplaces (Bryson and Forth, 2011). It may 
well be, therefore, that once these factors are controlled for, as they have been to a certain extent in 
this study, the trade union effect generating the traditional trade union training premium 
disappears.  
Finally, previous studies of the determinants of training have also produced seemingly 
ĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚŝŶŐƌĞƐƵůƚƐǁŝƚŚƌĞƐƉĞĐƚƚŽƚŚĞ ‘ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞ ?ǀĞƌƐƵƐ ‘ƉƵďůŝĐ ?ƐĞĐƚŽƌĚŝǀŝƐŝŽŶ ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞƐĞĞŬŝŶŐƚŽ
examine the possibility of some training advantage which accrues to the individual employed within 
the public sector. In the results reported, there are training inequalities to be found not only across 
predominantly private sector and predominantly public sector SICs but also within private sector and 
public sector workplaces. What is of consequence in the context of training inequalities is both the 
SIC of the activity undertaken at the workplace and the formal status of the workplace at which the 
individual is employed, not whether it iƐ ‘ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞ ?ƐĞĐƚŽƌŽƌ ‘ƉƵďůŝĐ ?ƐĞĐƚŽƌ ?/ŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞǆƚŽĨƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐ ?
therefore, ƚŚĞ ‘ƉƵďůŝĐƐĞĐƚŽƌ ?ĐĂŶŶŽƚďĞƚƌĞĂƚĞĚĂƐĂŶŚŽŵŽŐĞŶĞŽƵƐĞŶƚŝƚǇ ? 
Conclusions 
There are two important limitations in this investigation into inequalities in the distribution of 
training. Both are associated with the WERS 2011 data set used in the analysis. The first refers to the 
timing of the survey; and the second to the nature of the wording of the training question examined.  
The fieldwork for WERS 2011 took place between March 2011 and June 2012, shortly after 
the recession precipitated by the financial and economic crises of 2008. During the period of the 
recession, given the fall in output, the corresponding fall in the level of aggregate employment had 
been comparatively small (Gregg and Wadsworth, 2011). By 2012, nationally if not necessarily across 
all areas within Britain, it had recovered to its pre-recessionary level. However, there were 
substantial compositional changes to the stock of workplace jobs during this period, attributable to 
ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐ ?ĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚŝŶŐĨŝƐĐĂůƐƚĂŶĐĞƐŝŶƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽƚŚĞƐĞĐƌŝƐĞƐ ?tŚĞƌĞĂƐĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚ
in the private sector decreased during 2008 -2009, employment in the public sector increased. 
Thereafter, whereas employment in the private sector increased, employment in the public sector 
decreased.  
In addition to this change in the stock of workplace jobs, the recession also had a negative 
impact upon, inter alia, training decisions. Although less than two per cent of the managers surveyed 
for WERS 2011 reported that a reduction in training expenditures had been one way in which their 
workplaces responded to the recession, over one in 10 in the survey of employees associated with 
WERS 2011 who were at the workplace during the recession mentioned that access to training had 
been restricted during this period. ĞƌƚĂŝŶůǇŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨ'ƌĞĞŶ ?Ɛbasic ŵŽĚĞůŽĨƚŚĞĞŵƉůŽǇĞƌ ?Ɛ
training decision, any probable reduction in the total benefits (net of total costs) which accrue from 
training in normal times will reduce the optimum amount of training undertaken at the workplace. 
Quite probably, this will have a differential impact across workers within workplaces. Further, most 
likely it will be employees at the benefit/cost margins who will be the more ůŝŬĞůǇƚŽďĞƚŚĞ ‘ƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐ
ůŽƐĞƌƐ ? ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞƚŚĞolder rather than the younger; the low-skilled rather than the high skilled.  
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It is quite possible that workplace reductions in training expenditures and restricted access 
to training for some employees continued beyond 2008-9 into 2011-12. Therefore, it is conceded 
that in several respects the period of the survey may have been an atypical one for undertaking a 
cross section examination of training incidence and training intensity. 
There are certain problems, of both a theoretical and empirical nature, which arise as a 
consequence of the wording of the question in the survey of employees used to examine training 
incidence and training intensity. It is not possible to determine whether the training in question was 
employer initiated or employee initiated (or resulted, ultimately, from some bargain between both 
parties); whether it was on-the-job or off-the-job (or some combination of both); and whether it 
waƐ ?ĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐĞĐŬĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ŽĨĂ ‘ŐĞŶĞƌĂů ?Žƌ ‘ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐ ?ŶĂƚƵƌĞ ? Furthermore, although training is 
conventionally assumed to be associated with formal learning activities such as courses and 
structured programmes of activity, there is a potential problem of interpretation in that what some 
individuals ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞĂŶĚĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞĂƐ ‘ƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐ ?ŵĂǇĚŝĨĨĞƌĨƌŽŵǁŚĂƚsome human resource 
management departments recognise, value and implement. For example, whereas the latter may 
assume that what is of consequence is the development of competencies directly related to 
enhancing job performance, the former may perceive training only as an activity which facilitates 
progress and promotion either within the internal labour market of the workplace/organisation or 
within the wider external labour market.  
It is too facile to treat and therefore ĚŝƐŵŝƐƐĂůůŽĨƚŚŝƐĂƐŵĞƌĞ ‘ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞŵĞŶƚ ?ĞƌƌŽƌ ?ĂƌĚ ?
2001), although there are certainly elements of this within it. Rather it is more important to 
emphasise that this exercise of investigating training incidence and training intensity was 
constrained to examining a subjective, quantitative measure of training volume according to 
ĞŵƉůŽǇĞĞƐ ?responses to a specific question put in the survey of employees associated with WERS 
2011.  
Nevertheless, there are two important conclusions to be made from this novel analysis of 
the internationally acclaimed WERS 2011 data set. First, the analysis suggests that the training 
premia which traditionally accrued to selected groups within the workforce  W males, graduates, 
those holding permanent contracts of employment and trade union members  W appear to be 
diminishing if not disappearing. Future research, perhaps making use of alternative data sets, is now 
necessary to corroborate this finding and offer more substantive explanations for the phenomenon 
observed. Secondly, the analysis reaffirms the importance of certain variables  W notably age, pay 
grade and tenure  W in determining training outcomes. The likelihood of receiving training, and 
receiving proportionately more days of training, is greater for those in the relatively younger age 
groups, the relatively higher pay grades and new or recent recruits to the workplace. One corollary 
of this, however, is that it reveals the inequalities which exist in the distribution of training by 
identifying the individuals who receive either no or few training opportunities.   
Ultimately, what is of consequence is that the training an individual receives is appropriate 
to his/her immediate and longer run skills development requirements, and that the skills acquired 
are put to productive use in the workplace at which he/she is employed. By training, therefore, what 
employers are doing is augmenting the supply of skills. The policy agenda recognises the salience of 
the workplace and the crucial role played by the employer in skills formation. However, what the 
policy agenda needs to address more forcibly are the issues made manifest in the findings of this 
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research investigation, viz. that more than 30 per cent of employees in employment receive no 
training; that such is the limited amount of training received by the majority of those who do receive 
training that any skills development which results is highly unlikely to generate the economic and 
social benefits with which white papers associate them; and that many individuals within the 
workforce who are in most need of skills development to improve their prospects in the labour 
market are the very individuals who receive no training.  
Inequalities in the distribution of training are inevitable when a private benefit-cost calculus 
is used to determine training decisions because there is little or no profit to be made by employers 
from making human capital investments in many segments of their workforces. It is not an example 
of market failure. It is a failure on the part of policy makers to recognise that the use of exclusively 
private criteria in the training decision will not produce the socially optimum outcomes which they 
seek. Further, it is the task of public policy to recognise that formal training of the type examined 
here is but one component part of the process of skills formation. And, to the extent that there are 
shortfalls identified for some groups of individuals within this part, there is a need to compensate for 
this elsewhere. One such possibility is programmes to train low skilled employees of small firms, 
because there are a disproportionately high number of low paid, low skilled employees within the 
working population in Britain. Finally, there is a need to appreciate that achieving goals such as 
removing employment and wage inequalities and promoting greater inter-generational social 
mobility will entail moving beyond the neo-liberal supply-side policy perspective and recognise the 
need to design and implement public policies which seek to change the process and product 





An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Work, Pensions and Labour Economics Study 
Group (WPEG) annual conference at the University of Sheffield, 25th and 26th July, 2013. With the 
usual disclaimer, the author acknowledges the constructive comments made by participants in the 
 ‘DĂƚĐŚĞĚŵƉůŽǇĞƌ-ŵƉůŽǇĞĞ ?ƐĞƐƐŝŽŶ. Additionally, and again with the same disclaimer, the author 
acknowledges the helpful observations made by an anonymous reviewer of an earlier version of this 
paper. 
   
                                                          
Notes 
 
1 dŚĞŽƉĞŶŝŶŐƉĂƌĂŐƌĂƉŚŽĨ ‘ZŝŐŽƵƌĂŶĚZĞƐƉŽŶƐŝǀĞŶĞƐƐŝŶ^ŬŝůůƐ ?, the most recent government white 
paper of relevance, illustrates well some of these observations ? “/ŶƚŽĚĂǇ ?ƐŐůŽďĂůƌĂĐĞ we need a 
highly skilled workforce. Higher levels of skills help workers to become more effective: 20% of the 
growth in the output of UK workers can be attributed to the growth in their skill levels. Those who 
improve their skills are more likely to go on to further study or to progress higher in their chosen 
occupation. They are also more likely to have children who are more successful in school. So getting 
ŽƵƌǀŽĐĂƚŝŽŶĂůĂŶĚƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂůĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶƐǇƐƚĞŵƌŝŐŚƚŝƐďŽƚŚƐŽĐŝĂůůǇĂŶĚĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĂůůǇǀŝƚĂů ?(DfE and 
BIS, 2013, p. 1).  
2 The Workplace Employment Relations Study, 2011 was sponsored by: the Department for Business, 
Innovation and Skills (BIS), the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), the UK Commission for 
Employment and Skills (UKCES), the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS) and the 
National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR). The principal investigators were: BIS, 
ACAS, and NIESR.  The data were collected by NatCen Social Research. The data were deposited at 
the UK Data Archive (UKDA) by BIS. The data were accessed via UKDA. Crown copyright is held jointly 
with ESRC, UKCES, ACAS and NIESR. Crown copyright material is reproduced with the permission of 
ƚŚĞŽŶƚƌŽůůĞƌŽĨ,D^KĂŶĚƚŚĞYƵĞĞŶ ?ƐWƌŝŶƚĞƌĨŽƌ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ?EŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞĂďŽǀĞƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ bears any 
responsibility for the analysis of the data set undertaken or any interpretation made from this 
analysis. The bibliographic citation for this data collection is: Department for Business, Innovation 
and Skills, Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service and National Institute of Economic and 
Social Research, Workplace Employee Relations Survey, 2011 [computer file]. Colchester, Essex: UK 
Data Archive [distributor], February, 2013. SN: 7226, http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-7226-1.  
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Table 1. Percentage dŝƐƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘days of training received in the last 12 mŽŶƚŚƐ ? ? ? ? ? ?, 2004 and 
2011. 
 Days Percentage (2011) Percentage (2004) Percentage (1998) 
None 31.99 34.02 36.07 
Less than 1 12.77 9.25 8.53 
1 to less than 2 17.01 15.10 14.47 
2 to less than 5 22.33 21.95 21.98 
5 to less than 10 9.75 10.26 9.98 
10 days or more 6.14 8.67 8.98 
Number of observations 21,794 22,221 28, 019 
 
^ŽƵƌĐĞ PƵƚŚŽƌ ?ƐŽǁŶĐĂůĐƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŽƌŝŐŝŶĂůĚĂƚĂƐĞƚƐ ?EŽƚĞ ?ŝŶƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?^ƵƌǀĞǇŽĨĞŵƉůŽǇĞĞƐ





Table 2.  ‘& ?tests for the joint statistical significance of sets of factor variables in the logistic 
rĞŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶŽĨ ‘training iŶĐŝĚĞŶĐĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞordered logistic rĞŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶŽĨ ‘training iŶƚĞŶƐŝƚǇ ?. 




Factor Sets Df F P > F Df F P > F 
Age band (8, 19854) 8.47 0.0000 (8,19854) 16.87 0.0000 
Pay grade (13, 19854) 6.25 0.0000 (13, 19854) 12.12 0.0000 
Job status (2, 19854) 0.66 0.5184 (2, 19854) 5.79 0.0031 















Workplace size (5, 19854) 12.92 0.0000 (5, 19854) 7.16 0.0000 
SIC of workplace (16, 19854) 18.56 0.0000 (16,19854) 22.13 0.0000 















Footnote to Table 2:  




Table 3. Estimation results: logistic regression of the dependent vĂƌŝĂďůĞ ‘training iŶĐŝĚĞŶĐĞ ?; and the 
ordered logistic rĞŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶŽĨ ‘tƌĂŝŶŝŶŐŝŶƚĞŶƐŝƚǇ ?.  
Variable Coefficient >ŝŶ ?ĞĚ^ƚĚ 
Error 
P > |t| Coefficient >ŝŶ ?ĞĚ
Std Error 
P > |t| 
 Training Incidence Training Intensity 
Female (=1) .0625 .0560 0.265 -.0859 .0446 0.054 














18 -19 .4384 .1935 0.023 .5300 .1695 0.002 
20 -21 .4214 .1590 0.008 .6400 .1545 0.000 
22 -29 .1991 .0876 0.023 .3177 .0688 0.000 
30 -39 *       
40 -49 -.1905 .0715 0.008 -.1346 .0535 0.012 
50 -59 -.2919 .0771 0.000 -.2556 .0566 0.000 
60 -64 -.3774 .1158 0.001 -.4692 .0840 0.000 
65 and above -.7847 .1718 0.000 -.7246 .1526 0.000 











































Pay Grade (£s, per 
week) 



















61  W100 -.2380 .1590 0.135 -.2996 .1231 0.015 
101 -130 -.2031 .1626 0.212 -.0258 .1399 0.853 
131 -170 *       
171 -220  -.1097 .1382 0.427 -.0574 .1083 0.596 
221  W260 .0179 .1374 0.896 .1593 .1112 0.152 
261 -310 .1579 .1376 0.251 .1757 .1083 0.105 
311 -370  .2333 .1368 0.088 .2853 .1085 0.009 
371 -430 .2328 .1409 0.099 .3275 .1136 0.004 
431 -520 .3883 .1413 0.006 .5071 .1109 0.000 
521 -650 .5188 .1466 0.000 .5910 .1111 0.000 
651 -820 .7705 .1523 0.000 .7657 .1149 0.000 
821 -1,050 .5780 .1727 0.001 .7612 .1320 0.000 





Table 3 (cont.) 
Variable Coefficient >ŝŶ ?ĞĚ
Std 
Error 
P > |t| Coefficient >ŝŶ ?ĞĚ^ƚĚ 
Error 
P > |t| 
 Training Incidence Training Intensity 
Job Status 
Permanent * 
      
Temporary -.1391 .1253 0.267 -.3088 .0960 0.001 
Fixed period -.0572 .1554 0.713 .1025 .1154 0.374 
Tenure (in years) 













 1 - < 2 *       
2 - < 5  -.2074 .0924 0.025 -.1347 .0691 0.051 
5 - < 10 -.2947 .0943 0.002 -.2809 .0701 0.000 
10 or more -.4226 .0952 0.000 -.3203 .0717 0.000 
Trade Union 
Membership 
A member * 
      
No, but have been -.1377 .0772 0.075 -.0648 .0569 0.255 
No, and have 
never been 
-.2550 .0662 0.000 -.1898 .0486 0.000 
Size of Workplace 
(in numbers of 
employees) 

























10 -19 -.2294 .0886 0.010 -.1854 .0718 0.010 
20 -49 -.1968 .0754 0.009 -.1816 .0614 0.003 
50 -99 *       
100 -499 .1793 .0770 0.020 .0230 .0605 0.703 
500 or more .2476 .0882 0.005 .0774 .0672 0.250 














































































































Table 3 (cont.) 
Variable Coefficient >ŝŶ ?ĞĚ^ƚĚ 
Error 
P > |t| Coefficient >ŝŶ ?ĞĚ 
Std Error 
P > |t| 
Financial and insurance activities -.1866 .2020 0.356 -.1689 .1466 0.249 
Real estate activities .4507 .1600 0.005 .3034 .1058 0.004 
Professional, scientific and technical activities -.2945 .1357 0.030 -.5134 .1009 0.000 
Admin. and support services activities -.6067 .1677 0.000 -.5707 .1386 0.000 
Public admin. and defence  -.1508 .0968 0.119 -.0981 .0692 0.156 
Education *       
Human health and social work activities .9004 .0938 0.000 .5302 .0579 0.000 
Arts, entertainment and recreation .0833 .1390 0.549 -.0335 .1084 0.757 
Other service activities -.2354 .1510 0.119 -.1481 .1270 0.244 
Formal Status of Workplace 













Private limited company -.1942 .1016 0.056 -.0688 .0746 0.357 
Company limited by guarantee .2729 .1703 0.109 .1082 .1049 0.302 
Partnership/self-proprietor -.1864 .1329 0.161 .0369 .1016 0.716 
Trust/charity .0525 .1066 0.622 .0635 .0671 .0344 
Body established by royal charter -.4168 .2601 0.109 -.1588 .2145 0.459 
Co-op/mutual/friendly society -.0025 .2528 0.992 .0233 .1769 0.895 
Government owned limited company -.6260 .1507 0.000 -.5359 .1290 0.000 
Public service agency .2027 .1463 0.166 .1893 .0951 0.047 
Other non-trading public corporation -.4139 .2603 0.112 -.2928 .1873 0.118 
QUANGO 1.4783 .4769 0.002 1.0165 .2571 0.000 
Local/central government *       
Constant 1.1867 .1681 0.000    
/cut 1    -1.1445 .1324 0.000 
/ cut 2    -.5267 .1316 0.000 
/ cut 3    .2643 .1315 0.045 
/ cut 4    1.5593 .1332 0.000 
/ cut 5    2.6645 .1377 0.000 
   
Number of observations =  19,855 =  19,855 
Population size =  90.6243   =  90.6243 
Design df = 19,854   =  19,854 
F (66, 19,789) =  16.51 (66, 19,789) + 24.85 
Prob > F =  0.0000 = 0.0000 
 
Footnotes to Table 3:  
*denotes omitted reference category.  
dy/dx for the factor levels is the discrete change from the base level.  
** denotes statistically significant at (p < 0.05) 
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Table 4. Average marginal effects of the six outcomes (in terms of number of days of training 
received) associated with the ordered logistic rĞŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶŽĨ ‘training iŶĐŝĚĞŶĐĞ ?.  
Variable None Less 
than 1 
day 
1 to less 
than 2 
2 to less 
than 5 
5 to less 
than 10 
10 or more 
Female (=1) .017 .002 -.000 -.007 -.005 -.004 














18 -19 -.092** -.019** -.005 .038** .040** .038** 
20 -21 -.108** -.024** -.009 .044** .049** .048** 
22 -29 -.057** -.010** -.001 .025** .023** .020** 
30 -39 *       
40 -49 .026** .003** -.001** -.012** -.009** -.007** 
50 -59 .051** .005** -.003** -.023** -.017** -.013** 
60 -64 .096** .008** -.009** -.043** -.029** -.022** 
65 and above .152** .008** -.019** -.067** -.042** -.031** 
Graduate (=1) .008 .001 -.000 -.003 -.002 -.002 




























Supervise other staff (=1) -.075** -.011** .001** .034** .023** .023** 
Pay Grade (£s, per week) 













61  W100 .067** .000 -.012** -.029** -.015** -.010** 
101 -130 .055 .000 -.000 -.002 -.001 -.001 
131 -170 *       
171 -220  .012 .000 -.001 -.005 -.003 -.002 
221  W260 -.034 -.002 .004 .015 .009 .006 
261 -310 -.037 -.002 .004 .017 .010 .007 
311 -370  -.060** -.005** .006** .028** .017** .012** 
371 -430 -.068** -.006** .007** .032** .020** .015** 
431 -520 -.103** -.012** .008** .048** .033** .025** 
521 -650 -.119** -.015** .007** .055** .040** .030** 
651 -820 -.149** -.022** .005 .069** .053** .042** 
821 -1,050 -.148** -.022** .005 .069** .053** .042** 





Table 4. (cont.) 
Variable None less than 1 1 to less 
than 2 
2 to less 
than 5 






      
Temporary .062** .006** -.005** -.028** -.019** -.015** 
Fixed period -.019 -.002 .000** .008 .007 .006 
Tenure (in years) 













 1 - < 2 *       
2 - < 5  .025** .004 -.000 -.011** -.009 -.008 
5 - < 10 .054** .007** -.001** -.024** -.019** -.016** 
10 or more .062** .008** -.002** -.028** -.022** -.018** 
Trade Union Membership 
A member * 
      
No, but have been .012 .001 -.000 -.005 -.004 -.003 
No, and have never been .036** .005** -.001** -.016** -.013** -.010** 
Size of Workplace (in numbers of 
employees) 



















10 -19 .036** .004** -.002** -.016** -.012** -.009** 
20 -49 .035** .004** -.001** -.016** -.012** -.009** 
50 -99 *       
100 -499 -.004 -.000 .000 .002 .001 .001 
500 or more -.014 -.002 .000 .006 .005 .004 














Electricity, gas etc. supply  -.048 -.012** -.005 .021 .024 .022 
Water supply, sewerage etc. .004 .000 .000 -.001 -.001 -.001 
Construction .073** .012** -.001 -.035** -.028** -.021** 
Wholesale and retail .141** .017** -.009** -.067** -.047** -.035** 
Transportation and storage .095** .014** -.003 -.045** -.034** -.026** 
Accommodation and food 
service 
.107** .015** -.004 -.051** -.038** -.029** 





Table 4. (cont.) 
Variable None less 
than 1 
1 to less 
than 2 
2 to less 
than 5 




Financial and insurance activities .031 .006 .000 -.014 -.012 -.010** 
Real estate activities -.050** -.013** -.006** .021** .025** .022** 
Professional, scientific and technical activities .100** .015** -.003 -.048** -.036** -.027** 
Admin. and support services activities .113** .016** -.005 -.054** -.039** -.030** 
Public admin. and defence  .017 .003 .000 -.008 -.007 -.006 
Education *       
Human health and social work activities -.083** -.024** -.014** .033** .045** .043** 
Arts, entertainment and recreation .006 .001 .000 -.002 -.002 -.002 
Other service activities .027 .005 .000 -.012 -.011 -.009 
Formal Status of Workplace 













Private limited company .013 .001 -.000 -.006 -.004 -.003 
Company limited by guarantee -.020 -.003 .000 .009 .007 .006 
Partnership/self-proprietor -.007 -.001 .000 .003 .002 .002 
Trust/charity -.012 -.001 .000 .005 .004 .003 
Body established by royal charter .031 .003 -.002 -.014 -.010 -.008 
Co-op/mutual/friendly society -.004 -.000 .000 .002 .001 .001 
Government owned limited company .112** .008** -.013** -.050** -.032** -.023** 
Public service agency -.035** -.005** .000 .016** .013 .011 
Other non-trading public corporation .059 .006** -.005 -.027 -.018 -.014 
QUANGO -.160** -.041** -.023 .058** .080** .085** 
Local/central government *       
 
Footnotes to Table 4: 
*denotes omitted reference category 
dy/dx for the factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. 
** denotes statistically significant at (p < 0.05).  
 
